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Federal Judicial Independence:
Constitutional and Political
Perspectives
Martin EL Redish"
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the nation's beginning, the concept of federal judicial independence has been almost as confusing to political and constitutional
theorists as it is fundamental to the successful operation of our form of
constitutional democracy. On the one hand, the Constitution's framers
consciously chose to insulate members of the federal judiciary from at
least the most acute forms of potential political pressure by expressly
providing for the protection of their salary and tenure.1 On the other
hand, the framers simultaneously provided the groundwork to facilitate
the exercise of seemingly substantial congressional control of the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, thereby potentially undermining the
very independence expressly provided to the judges of those courts.2
* Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University
School of Law. This article grew out of a paper prepared as academic consultant to the
Judicial Conference ofthe United States, Committee of the Judicial Branch Subcommittee
on Judicial Independence, and was the subject of addresses to the committee in June 1994
and to the executive session of the Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference in July 1994. The
conclusions reached here are, however, solely those of the author.
Portions of this Article will appear in Professor Redish's book, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE:
CONSTrrtrIONAL AND PoLmcAL PERs rlvEs, to be published by Oxford University Press.
The author would like to thank Alysia Faulkner of the class of 1996 at Northwestern
University School of Law for her valuable research assistance.
1. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1. 'See discussion infra note 2.
2. Article I, section 1 provides that "the judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress shall from time to time ordain and
establish." Both this language and generally accepted constitutional history are widely
deemed to establish that Congress need not have created lower federal courts. See MARTIN
H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 29-
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While this apparent theoretical contradiction is largely consistent with
the pragmatic balances found throughout the Constitution,
4 it has often
uncertainty.
doctrinal
and
theoretical'
to
both
rise
given
Additional questions might be raised concerning the extent to which
constitutionally guaranteed judicial independence conflicts with
congressional efforts either to exert control over the procedural operation
of the federal courts5 or to curb significantly the discretion of federal
judges in imposing criminal sentences." Further inquiry has been made
concerning the extent of any constitutional obligation of Congress not to
reduce the nonsalary support services that have already been supplied
to the federal judiciary. 7 Therefore, the time now appears ripe for a
wideranging reconsideration of the constitutional and political scope of
federal judicial independence!
Such a reexamination reveals that much of the present theoretical and
doctrinal confusion results from the general failure to recognize that the
concept of federal judicial independence can itself be sub-divided into
four conceivable categories: "institutional" independence, "lawmaking"
independence, "counter-majoritarian" independence, and "decisional"
independence." Institutional independence refers to the noncase specific
protections of salary and tenure explicitly provided in Article IlI of the
United States Constitution. They are described as "noncase specific"
because they concern the broad independence protections of the federal

44 (2d ed. 1990). The Supreme Court has reasoned that the power not to create the lower

courts includes the power to abolish them, and that the power to abolish the lower courts
subsumes the power to limit theirjurisdiction. See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182
(1943). While Article i mandates the creation of the Supreme Court, it narrowly confines
its original jurisdiction and provides that its appellate jurisdiction is subject to regulations
and exceptions made by Congress. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2. See Redish, supra note 2, at
25-29.
3. Compare Lawrence Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress'

Authority to Regulate the Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981)
(salary and tenure protections limit congressional power to control federal jurisdiction) with
Martin H. Redish, CongressionalPower to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to
ProfessorSager, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 143 (1982) (salary and tenure protections apply only
to cases left within federal court jurisdiction).
4. See discussion infra parts II-V.
5. See discussion infra part V.

6. Id.
7. See discussion infra part II.
8. Note that this study excludes consideration of the constitutional standards for
judicial tenure, a subject possessing a unique history. See generallyReport of the National

Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal (1993); Peter M. Shane, Who May
Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1

(1993).
9.

See discussion infra parts I-V.
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judiciary as an institution, untied to the adjudication of a specific case,
group of cases, or substantive issue. Thus, a federal statute seeking to
reduce the salaries of federal judges could presumably be held unconstitutional on its face, even though the reduction was. not tied to the
prospective adjudication of particular cases." Lawmaking independence refers to the ability of the federal courts to create either controlling substantive legal principles or governing general rules of procedure
in the course of individual adjudications, free from interference by the
other branches of the federal government."
Counter-majoritarian
independence describes the ability of the federal courts to interpret
applicable provisions of the Constitution in the course of individual
adjudications.' Finally, decisional independence concerns the ability
of the federal courts to interpretand apply, rather than create substantive legal principles in the specific context of an individual adjudication,
free from control or interference by the purely political branches of the
federal government.
While the scope and meaning of institutional independence are
ascertained largely by resort to traditional methods of interpreting
constitutional text, 4 one is forced to resort to alternative methodologies
to ascertain the proper scope of the other sub-categories of judicial
independence. Ultimately, examination of constitutional text alone
proves unsatisfactory in performance of this task. Instead, one must
guide interpretation of that ambiguous text with a proper understanding
of the underlying principles of constitutional and political theory. While
decisional and counter-majoritarian independence are essential as
matters of both American political theory and constitutional directive,'
the same cannot be said of lawmaking independence in either its
substantive or procedural manifestations." Indeed, recognition of this
form of judicial independence would actually undermine the essence of
American democratic theory-a theory that places the primary power to
fashion sub-constitutional public policy in the hands of those who are
representative of and accountable to the electorate. 7
The first section of this Article explores the text, purposes, and
conceivable interpretive models of the textually provided guarantee of
10.
11.
12,
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
(1995).

See discussion infra part IV.
See discussion infra part III.
Id.
See discussion infra part IV.A.
See discussion infra part IV.A.1.
Id.
See discussion infra part IV.A.2.
See generally MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE
See also discussion infra part IV.B., P.C.
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institutional independence, as well as the most significant doctrinal
questions to which that provision gives rise. The second section
contrasts the concepts of decisional and lawmaking independence from
the perspective of both constitutional analysis and American political
theory. The Article then considers the implications of that analysis for
modem congressional efforts to constrict judicial decision making
authority on both substantive and procedural fronts.
II. INsTrTUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE: THE PROPER SCOPE OF THE
COMPENSATION CLAUSE

Although the Constitution gives Congress discretion to create lower
federal courts, it mandates the presence of certain attributes if inferior
federal courts are created: "The Judges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall,
at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office."'
While
controversy existed at the time of the Constitution's framing over
whether a system of lower federal courts should be created, there was
apparently no significant disagreement that if inferior federal courts
were created they should be independent of the other branches of the
federal government. The framers sought to protect this independence by
the constitutional guarantee of salary and tenure.
At first glance, at least as to the issue of judicial salary, the Compensation Clause appears as straightforward as virtually any constitutional
provision. Closer examination reveals, however, that interpretation of
the Clause is fraught with potential confusion. For example, does the
protection against salary reduction extend to auxiliary services the
government provides, such as law clerks and secretaries? If not, does it
prohibit congressional reductions in these services when such reductions
are unambiguously imposed as retribution for a decision or series of
decisions made by the federal courts? Does the clause require salary
raises during periods of inflation, so that the judges' real income is not
diminished? Does it authorize the imposition of newly created general
nondiscriminatory taxes on judges that are applied to all citizens, or at
least to all federal employees?
In answering these questions, it is important to ascertain both the
likely purposes the framers sought to attain by the salary and tenure
protections and the particular methodology the framers chose to attain
those goals. The former may well be considerably more obvious than the
latter. The drafters of Article MIsought to insulate the federal judiciary

18.

U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
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from potential pressures, from either the representative branches of the
federal government or the public, that might skew the decision making
process or compromise the integrity or legitimacy of federal court
decisions.
In light of this reasoning, one might assume that any congressional
action that has the effect of threatening, or at least is intended to
threaten, federal judicial independence should be deemed a violation of
Article I. This conclusion is undermined, however, by recognizing the
particular methodology the drafters utilized to accomplish their purpose.
Basically, two conceivable modes of implementation were available, both
of which may be analogized to the alternative methods for determining
whether a suit is untimely when filed: a "statute of limitations"
approach and a "laches" approach. Under a laches approach, like the
doctrine of the same name, a court examines each case individually to
determine whether, under the circumstances, the concerns that gave rise
to the limitation are present." Thus, in deciding whether a suit is
untimely under a laches approach, a court would decide whether, in light
of all the relevant circumstances, it would be unfair or unreasonable to
allow the plaintiff to proceed.' By analogy, a court employing a caseby-case method to insure judicial independence would invalidate any
congressional action that, under all of the relevant circumstances,
presented a real threat to that independence.
By its terms, however, Article III rejects use of a case-by-case
methodology, and with good reason. Both the difficulties in determining
whether judicial independence has in fact been compromised in the
individual instance and the political friction that could result from such
an inquiry would be prohibitive. Instead, Article III clearly employs a
statute of limitations approach whereby a rigid "line in the sand" is
drawn and applied, regardless of the special needs of the individual
situation. Thus, in enforcing a statute of limitations a court is not
permitted, in an individual case, to conclude either that suit would be
unfair even though filed a day before the expiration of the statutory
period, or that suit would be fair despite the fact that it was filed a day
after expiration. Therefore, in determining the timeliness of a lawsuit,
a statute of limitations approach is employed for the very purpose of
avoiding the uncertainty inherent in use of a case-by-case approach.
Similarly, Article III imposes a rigid line disallowing reduction of federal
judicial compensation. However, other than its guarantee against salary
reduction, Article III imposes no further limitations on congressional
19. See generally Gafl L. Heriot, A Study in the Choice ofForm: Statutes ofLimitations
and the Doctrineof Laches, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 917.
20. Id.
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authority to regulate judicial benefits. Thus, as long as Congress has
not reduced judicial salaries, the Compensation Clause is neutral toward
congressional action, even when that action may actually undermine
judicial independence.
Under this analysis, a reduction in judicial support services, such as
law clerks and secretaries, would be unconstitutional only if we may
properly define the constitutional term "salary" to encompass such
services. If one were to employ an originalist approach to the definitional question, 1 the answer would almost certainly be no. There is no
reason to believe that the framers ever contemplated the concept of
support services. Even under a modern definitional model,' it is
highly unlikely that such support services could properly be squeezed
into the concept of "salary." Surely, the Internal Revenue Service today
does not consider an employer's provision of secretaries or assistants to
be part of an employee's taxable income.
It might be responded that such a narrow definitional approach to the
interpretation of constitutional provisions is unduly grudging in light of
the well-established flexible interpretive standards the Supreme Court
of the United States traditionally employs in constitutional analysis.
Pursuant to this argument, if the political and social purposes served by
a particular constitutional provision are fostered by an extension of that
provision's reach to distinct but analogous areas, such an extension is
proper. How one resolves this interpretive debate turns on issues of
constitutional theory that go well beyond the narrow issue of the
Compensation Clause's construction. My position, however, has long
been that unless at some outer boundary language imposes at least some
constraints, the Constitution effectively becomes meaningless (in the
literal sense of that term).' In any event, it is important to keep in
mind that if one were willing to construe the Compensation Clause to
extend to the provision of support services, the resulting limit on
congressional power could not be confined to selective retaliatory cuts in
support services. This is because of the methodology inherent in the
structure of that clause: violations are determined exclusively in a
manner that disclaims an inquiry into individualized social or political
consequences. Thus, if the clause were construed to protect against cuts
in non-salary benefits, it would have to extend as well to any such cut,
regardless of Congress' purpose or motivation for imposing that cut.

21. See generallyHenry Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudicationand Democrati Theory,
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259 (1981).
22. See REDISH, supra note 17, at 113-25.
23. I&
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If, on the other hand, one concludes (as I do) that by its terms the
Compensation Clause does not extend to nonsalary support services
under any circumstances, one would also have to conclude that the
clause fails to prohibit even cuts in support services unambiguously
designed as retaliation for a specific decision or series of decisions in the
federal courts. Such a conclusion flows inexorably from the choice,
inherent in Article III, in favor of an easily applied, unbending statute
of limitations approach to judicial independence. In fashioning the
Compensation Clause, the framers avoided reliance on a case-by-case
analysis of the effect of congressional actions on judicial independence
in favor of an easily applied, bright-line standard. As already noted,
they did so probably in an attempt to avoid the very uncertainty and
political friction that would plague an inquiry into the retributive nature
of congressional action. Thus, congressional retaliation that does not
actually reduce judicial salaries should not be deemed to violate Article
III.
Theoretically, though highly unlikely as a practical matter, Congress
could so drastically reduce judicial support services so as to render
impossible performance of the judicial function. Determining at exactly
what point that level is reached involves a factual question that would
have to be answered in each individual situation. It should be noted,
however, that once such a point is reached, the congressional action
would be unconstitutional only to the extent that the Constitution
requires federal judicial action. Because, under accepted constitutional
standards, state courts may constitutionally be vested with final
authority to resolve virtually all matters reached by the federal judicial
power, the category of matters that actually require Article III federal
judicial action is likely to be relatively small.
One might respond that while Congress may have the power to
exclude Article III federal court jurisdiction completely, as long as
Congress continues to vest jurisdiction in the federal courts, it has a
constitutional obligation, under inherent principles of separation of
powers, to enable federal courts to perform at a minimal level of
effectiveness. Hence, Congress is more likely to exercise its generally
accepted authority to curb federal court jurisdiction than to reduce
federal judicial support services below minimally operative levels.
It is conceivable, however, that such congressional retributive action
could violate due process in an individual litigation. That concept
requires a neutral and independent adjudicator.24 If judges are aware
that Congress has denied them benefits or privileges specifically because

24. See discussion infra part IH.
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they have decided particular cases in a particular manner, it is arguable
that they are rendered incapable of the requisite adjudicatory independence in future, similarly situated cases. Because Congress' retributive
action would presumably have no effect on the outcome of the specific
case to which Congress was reacting, the litigants in that case would
have neither practical interest nor legal standing to challenge the
congressional retributive action. Moreover, because such congressional
action would not violate Article III, it is doubtful that Congress' action
could be successfully challenged on its face. To the extent, however, one
could establish that (a) Congress' reduction in nonsalary judicial benefits
or privileges was in fact designed as retribution for past judicial
decisions, and (b) the litigant in a subsequent case stands in an identical
position to the successful litigants in the case or cases to which Congress
was negatively reacting, the subsequent litigant could conceivably raise
a successful due process challenge, not directly to the congressional
action, but rather to adjudication of his case by a federal judge in light
of that action. If state court adjudication were feasible under the
circumstances, presumably a transfer to that forum could satisfy due
process.
Pursuant to this reasoning, a congressional refusal to raise judicial
salaries, even a refusal motivated by retaliatory concerns, does not
violate Article III. It is true that during periods of inflation, if judges'
salaries are not increased, their real incomes decline. By inaction,
Congress could effectively reduce real income, posing a potentially
serious constitutional problem, especially if the salaries of other federal
Despite
officials are increased during the inflationary period.'
substantial inflation, the salaries of federal judges and a few other
federal officials were not substantially increased between 1969 and
1975.26 While the Supreme Court wisely held that congressional
attempts to revoke vested cost-of-living increases for Article III judges
violate the Compensation Clause,' Congress' failure to raise salaries
to keep pace with inflation is not unconstitutional. The history of the
enactment of the Compensation Clause indicates that the framers were
well acquainted with the problems of inflation and the need to make
periodic increases in the judges' salaries.' A proposal to provide that
judges' salaries could not be increased during their term of office was
defeated by arguments that such increases might be necessary to

25. See Keith Rosenn, The ConstitutionalGuarantyAgainst Diminution of Judicial
Compensation, 24 U.C.L. L. REV. 308 (1976).
26. Id. at 310 n.9.
27. Will v. United States, 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
28. See Rosenn, supra note 25, at 314-15.
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maintain the attractiveness of judicial service in light of changing
economic conditions and judicial work loads.'
The Constitution,
however, seems to leave to Congress' discretion the determination of
when such increases are warranted.
Acceptance of the bright line statute of limitations analogy as the
governing interpretive model for the Compensation Clause has interesting implications for several other variations. If one concludes that even
retaliatorymeasures that do not reduce judicial salaries are permissible
under such a model, it would seem reasonable to conclude that even
nonretaliatorycongressional actions are unconstitutional when they do,
in fact, reduce judicial salaries. After all, if the reason for adopting a
bright line approach is presumably to avoid the difficulty, uncertainty,
and political friction caused by a case-by-case inquiry into congressional
purpose and effect, one should be unwilling to allow Congress to purify
salary reductions by the assertion of nonretaliatory purposes. A bright
line is, after all, a bright line.
This conclusion would apply to any legislative reduction aimed
exclusively at judicial salaries." It is, no doubt, equally true of a
reduction imposed indirectly, as through a tax imposed exclusively on
judicial salaries. More uncertain, both theoretically and doctrinally, is
the constitutionality of nondiscriminatory reductions imposed on all
federal employees when Article III judges are included. The Supreme
Court has not adopted a clear position on the question. The issue first
arose when Congress sought to apply the new federal income tax to
sitting federal judges.3 After initially ruling that the tax could not be
imposed, even on judges appointed after the income tax was enacted,2
the Supreme Court reversed itself and held that a general nondiscriminatory tax could be applied to federal judges appointed after the
enactment of the tax." The decision emphasized that the tax did not
discriminate against judges and that judges, like all citizens, had a
responsibility to pay their fair share of the cost of government." The
decision seems to be based on the view that the purpose of the Compensation Clause is to protect federal judges from legislative attempts to
impinge on judicial independence.' A general income tax, applied to
all wage earners, poses little risk of such interference. Yet use of the

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

2 Max Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention 45 (1911).
See discussion supra part I.
Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920).
Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925).
OMalley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 282 (1939).
Id.
Id.
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bright line interpretive model effectively precludes reliance on such
reasoning.3
How one resolves the constitutionality of general salary reductions
applied to judicial incomes depends on whether one adopts what could
be described as the "antidiscrimination7 interpretation of the Compensation Clause. One could interpret Article III, much as the Free Exercise
Clause is currently construed,3' to insulate judicial salaries merely from
discriminatory treatment. When this approach is combined with the
bright line model, the result is that if Congress singles out judicial
salaries for reduction, that reduction is incapable of justification, for
whatever reason.' However, if Congress reduces judicial salaries as
part of a broader reduction in the salaries of all federal employees, the
inclusion of judicial salaries is constitutional.
While the antidiscrimination model appears difficult to reconcile with
the seemingly absolute terms of the Compensation Clause, it might be
defended as a relatively easily applied compromise that fulfills the core
independence concerns underlying the clause. This model accomplishes
this without either invoking a troublesome case-by-case approach or
significantly undermining legitimate efforts at fiscal restraint.
Whichever way one resolves this debate, it is important to note that the
conclusion reached should control both direct and indirect salary
reductions, for there exists no logical or practical basis on which to
distinguish between the two.' Given this fact, practical considerations
might well push a reasonable observer into acceptance of the antidiscrimination principle. Otherwise, one would be logically forced to reach
the arguably impractical conclusion that Congress may not constitutionally apply general increases in the income tax to sitting federal judges.
III.

DECISIONAL AND LAWMAKING INDEPENDENCE CONTRASTED

A

Defining Terms
When one moves analysis from the textually based guarantees of
institutional independence to more substantive aspects of judicial
independence, the nature of the inquiry shifts its focus from the words
of the Constitution to the theoretical framework underlying the relevant
constitutional provisions. Before exploring that framework, however, it

36. See discussion supra part H.C.2, EI.C.3.
37. See Smith v. Oregon, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
38. Cf Booth v. United States, 291 U.S. 339 (1934) (provision of federal statute
specifically reducing pensions of federal judges held unconstitutional).
39. See discussion supra part IH.C.2, HI.C.3.
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is necessary to understand the subtle but significant differences in the
types of substantive judicial independence.
The concept of decisional independence implies the ability of the judge
in a particular case to ascertain, interpret, and apply the governing legal
principles to the facts of the case before her as she deems appropriate,
free from external or extraneous influences and pressures that might
reasonably be thought to affect a decision. The concept of lawmaking
independence, on the other hand, concerns a judge's ability to fashion
general substantive rules of decision or rules of procedure that are
designed to govern not only the case before her but future similarly
situated cases as well. Admittedly, this distinction is not one between
day and night. It is, however, a distinction of fundamental importance.
Examination of both established constitutional principles and fundamental precepts of American political theory demonstrates that decisional
independence is the sine qua non of the federal judiciary's operation.
Lawmaking independence, on the other hand, is not centrally important
to performance of the judicial function and would often undermine the
principles of democratic theory that underlie the American political
system.
The FederalJudiciary'sRole in American Constitutional Theory
In providing for the creation of the federal judiciary, the framers
recognized the need for the federal courts to be insulated from the more
Article III therefore expressly
representative political branches.'
guarantees to federal judges protections of both salary and tenure."
Such independence is necessary, so that the federal courts may
effectively check the possible excesses of the majoritarian branches by
enforcing the counter-majoritarian limits the Constitution imposes and
maintaining the legitimacy of their decisions in the eyes of the public.'
At the same time, because of their insulation from majoritarian
pressure and the resultant threat to the workings of the democratic
process, the federal judiciary has been expressly confined to the exercise
Unless
of the traditional judicial function of case adjudication.4
limited in this manner, the largely unrepresentative and unaccountable
federal judiciary could threaten the fundamental principle of representaB.

40.

41.
42.

See, e.g., Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton).
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1. See discussion infra part I.
I have discussed this theory in detail in MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS

IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL JURISDICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 4-7,

75-85 (1991).
43. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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tionalism by usurping the policymaking power the legislative and
executive branches traditionally exercise.
To be sure, there exists a long Anglo-American tradition of substantive
common law development by the judiciary In the federal judicial
system, however, the tradition is largely to the contrary Since the early
years of the nation's existence, Congress has, in the Rules of Decision
Act," prohibited the federal courts from fashioning common law rules
of decision.'
While the Supreme Court has on occasion recognized
judge-made exceptions to this seemingly total statutory bar, the Court
has always emphasized the narrow and limited nature of these
exceptions.' In any event, even in those cases in which courts are
authorized to fashion sub-constitutional rules of decision, no one could
seriously doubt that a legislature has the authority to supersede common
law rules by appropriate legislative action. Thus, lawmaking independence is not part of the independence the Constitution guarantees to the
federal judiciary
C.

ConstitutionalSources of Federal DecisionalIndependence
Two constitutional principles provide the legal foundation for the
concept of the federal courts' decisional independence: due process and
separation of powers.
1. Due Process. The argument from due process postulates that
"[nHone of the core values of due process... can be fulfilled without the
participation of an independent adjudicator.' 7 The point, in other
words, is that the procedural safeguards of notice, hearing, counsel,
transcript, and the ability to call or cross-examine witnesses, all methods
of assuring decisional accuracy and essential elements of fair procedure,
are of little value if the decision maker bases his finding on factors other
than his neutral assessment of the evidence.
The absence of a neutral adjudicator contravenes both the instrumental and noninstrumental values thought to underlie due process. To the
extent decision is based on factors other than fair assessment of the

44.

28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).

45. The statute precludes the fashioning by the federal courts of purely substantive
common law, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and certain rules that implicate
both substantive and procedural concerns. See generally Martin H. Redish & Carter G.
Phillips, Erie and the Rules of DecisionAct: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91
HARV. L. REV. 356 (1977).
46. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 506-08 (1988); Wallis
v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69 (1966).
47. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the
Values of ProceduralDue Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 476 (1986).
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evidence, the instrumental goal of accurate decision making is of course
undermined. To the extent one places a value on considerations that
affect a litigant's individual self-worth and faith in and respect for the
adjudicatory system, the absence of a neutral adjudicator is also a
matter of grave concern.' At the very least, adjudicatory independence
is therefore a necessary condition of truly fair procedure, which in turn,
is the essence of procedural due process.
Due process is of only limited value as a protector of decisional
independence, however, for two reasons. First, by its terms, the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause is triggered only when a cognizable
life, liberty, or property interest is at stake, 9 concepts which have
received appropriately limited construction.'e Second, even when the
clause is invoked, determination of exactly what constitutes an
remains in a
unconstitutional encroachment
51 of decisional independence
state of doctrinal uncertainty
2. Separation of Powers-Formalism. There exist several textual
sources for the separation-of-powers' protections of federal decisional
independence. First, Article IH expressly vests "the judicial power" in
the judicial branch, 2 and this directive, however ultimately defined,
may be violated by attempts by other branches to usurp the judiciary's
decisional authority. Under a so-called formalist model of separation of
powers,5 no branch may exercise authority not delegated to it by the
Constitution. The key element of the formalist model is its rejection of

48. See id. at 476-91.
49. U.S. CoNST. amend. V. The same, of course, is true of the Fourteenth Amendment.
50. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
51.

Compare Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (mere possibility of financial

temptation of adjudicator violates due process) with Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47
(1975) (in order to overcome presumption of honesty and integrity of administrative
officials, a party must "convince the court that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological
tendencies and human weaknesstes]" a combination of investigatory with adjudicative

functions poses undue risk of partiality.). See also Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752
(1994) (lack of fixed term of office for military judges does not violate due process).
52.
53.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
The dictates of formalism in the separation-of-powers context have been described

in the following manner
Any exercise of governmental power, and any governmental institution exercising
that power, must either fit within one of the three formal categories [legislative,
executive, or judicial] ... or find explicit constitutional authorization for such

deviation. The separation of powers principle is violated whenever the categorizations of the exercised power and the exercising institution do not match and the
Constitution does not specifically permit such blending.
Gary Lawson, TerritorialGovernments,and the Limits of Formalism,78 CAL. L. REV. 853,

858 (1990) (footnote omitted).
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any form of pragmatic or functionalist balancing test that could
conceivably authorize exceptions to the Constitution's tripartite
distribution of power when social circumstances are found to warrant."
Beyond that point, however, the sub-models of formalism differ in their
definitional approach to branch power. What could be called classic
formalism employs an originalistic' and/or rigidly syllogistic' approach to the definition of branch power. In this manifestation,
formalism has been the subject of severe criticism by legal theorists.5 7
However, formalism may also be utilized in a more pragmatic fashion,
leading to what I have previously referred to as the "pragmatic
formalist" model.' This version of formalism posits that [in fashioning its definitions of branch power, the Court should look to a combination of policy, tradition, precedent, and linguistic analysis.'
Under a formalist model, Congress may, pursuant to Article I, exercise
only the legislative power; pursuant to Article H the president may
exercise only the executive power; and pursuant to Article III the
judiciary exercises the judicial power. While other provisions of the
Constitution on occasion delegate narrowly framed supplemental powers
to the branches,') for the most part, according to the formalist model,
branch authority is confined by the definitional scope of the authority
granted to it in one of the first three Articles.
Under the formalist approach, the judiciary's power is protected by the
simple fact that the judicial power has not been delegated to the other
branches. However, it does not necessarily follow that the respective
branch powers are hermetically insulated from each other. 7b the extent
the powers of the other two branches might reasonably be defined to
include activities that could also be appropriately characterized as
judicial, a strict formalist model may not fully protect the judiciarys
exercise of the judicial power. One might therefore supplement a strict

54. Id.
55. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the OriginalUnderstanding,60 B.U. L.
REV. 204 (1980); Note, Mistretta v. United States: Mistreating the Separationof Powers
Doctrine?, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 209 (1991).

56. Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A FormalisticPerspectiveon Why the Court
Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 343 (1989).
57. See, e.g., Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About Legislative.
Executive Separationof Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 430 (1987).
58. REDISH, supra note 42.
59. Id. at 455 (footnote omitted).
60. For example, the Appointments Clause of Article II, § 2 provides that Congress may
vest the appointment of "inferior officers" in "the Courts of Law," even though performance
of such a function does not implicate adjudication of a case or controversy. See Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 655 (1988).
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formalist model with a form of functionalism to deal with situations in
which the definitional approach of formalism is satisfied by a particular
exercise of branch power; however, a significant threat to the values of
branch integrity nevertheless results. A supplemental functionalist
model therefore posits that while the definition of branch power provides
a floor for separation of powers, even when a branch acts within the
scope of its delegated powers such action may be unconstitutional if it
is found to unduly interfere with the proper operation of another branch.
3.
Separation of Powers-Functionalism. The primary
theoretical alternative to the formalist model of separation of powers is
the functionalist model. Use of a purely functionalist model could
conceivably allow what are admittedly invasions of the judicial province
by the other branches under certain circumstances. The unifying
philosophy that underlies all of the variants of the functionalist model
is a willingness to ignore definitional or conceptual constraints on
branch power in light of the needs of the applicable social and political
context.6 Beyond that, the variants differ in the contextual factors
they deem relevant. Under one sub-model, which might be labeled the
internal functionalist approach, even when a branch's actions do not fall
within the scope of its constitutionally authorized powers "the reviewing
court invalidates branch usurpation only if it is found to reach some
unspecified quantitative level of intensity-in other words, if it is found
to undermine another branch's performance of its essential function or
This sub-model's
to acrete 'too much' power to the usurping branch.'
focus is thus on the internal effect of the usurpation on the operation of
branch power.
Under a second sub-model, which could be described either as an
external functionalist or ad hoc balancing approach, "branch usurpation
may be justified by a sufficiently strong competing social interest
.... I While the first sub-model is satisfied as long as no branch
either gains or loses "too much" power, the second sub-model contrasts
the intensity of the asserted social justification for the usurpation of one
branch's power by another branch against the harmful effects thought
to derive from that usurpation.
Under a functionalist model, it is conceivable that Congress could
openly usurp the judicial power with impunity as long as a reviewing
court concludes either that the judiciary's province has not been invaded
unduly or that a competing social interest justifies such usurpation.

61. Lawson, supra note 53, at 853.
62. REDISH, supra note 42, at 125.

63. Id.
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Because of the inherently subjective and unpredictable nature of all
variants of the functionalist model, it is simply impossible to predict a
decision -on the constitutionality of particular legislative or executive
invasions of the judicial province when employing a functionalist
standard.
Although some form of functionalism appears to dominate much recent
Supreme Court precedent," both of these sub-models are subject to
severe criticism because they either "ultimately degenerateD into little
more than the statement of a wholly subjective conclusion7' or
"undermine the key structural assumption of separation of powers
theory-that it will be impossible (at least until it is too late) to
determine whether or not a particular breach of branch separation will
seriously threaten the core political values of accountability, diversity,
and checking."
IV. IMPLICAIONS OF THE DECISIONAL-LAWMAKING DISTINCTION, I:
CONGRESSIONAL LIMITATION OF FEDERAL COURT POWER TO PRESCRIBE
SUBSTANTIVE RULES OF DECISION

A. The Decisional-LawmakingDistinctionFrom the Perspectives of
Constitutionaland PoliticalTheory
Application of accepted principles of American constitutional and
political theory to the decisional-lawmaking distinction gives rise to four
basic conclusions: (1) Congress may adopt constitutionally valid
generalized rules of both decision and process, and require the federal
courts to enforce them; (2) Congress may not dictate to the federal courts
how to interpret the Constitution; (3) Congress may not constitutionally
adopt a particular rule of decision yet indirectly require the federal
courts to enforce a different or contrary rule of decision; (4) Congress
may not directly dictate the result of a particular litigation.
Although by considerations of tradition, constitutional text, and
political theory, Congress possesses substantial power to control the
jurisdiction of the federal courts,6' separation of powers principles may

64. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361 (1989).
65. REDISH, supra note 42, at 125.
66. Id
67. Article III, § 1 provides that the judicial power shall be vested in such inferior
courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Supreme Court has
reasoned that since Congress need not have created lower federal courts it may also abolish
them once created and that this greater power of abolition logically includes the lesser
power of curbingjurisdiction. See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Sheldon v. Sill,
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nevertheless limit the scope of that power. Congress may often exclude
completely the Article III courts from the adjudicatory process, as long
as the due process requirement of an independent adjudicator is satisfied
through alternative means.' However, severe limits exist on Congress'
power to employ the Article II courts for interpretation or enforcement
yet simultaneously restrict the scope of their decisional authority.
Congress seriously threatens the concept of decisional independence by
allowing the federal courts to adjudicate cases within their proper
jurisdiction while simultaneously excluding from the scope of the judicial
inquiry constitutional or legal issues that may arise in the course of the
litigation, or by directing how part or all of a particular case is to be
decided.
It is generally accepted that Congress has constitutional power to
exclude completely the lower federal courts from adjudication of a
particular category of cases, as'long as the only consequence is to have
State courts have
the matters adjudicated in the state courts."
traditionally been deemed competent adjudicators and enforcers of
federal rights70 and bound by the Supremacy Clause71 to give effect
However, when Congress does vest
to controlling federal law."
adjudicatory authority in the federal courts, separation-of-powers
principles impose certain limits on congressional authority to control the
outcome of the case, either by directing decision or excluding judicial
power to resolve particular legal or factual questions that arise in the
case.
The source and contours of this separation-of-powers limitation are
somewhat murky, especially in light of the well established principle
that, within constitutional bounds, Congress may provide the substantive rule of decision for a case falling within the federal court's federal
question jurisdiction.7 Surely, no one could doubt that the federal
courts lack authority either to ignore or overrule congressionally dictated
substantive rules of decision, as long as those rules are found to be

49 U.s. (8 How.) 441 (1850). While not everyone has agreed that Congress' power should
be construed this broadly as a doctrinal matter the existence of such power appears well

established. See, e.g., Akhil Amar, A Neo-FederalietView ofArticle III: Separatingthe Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction,65 B.U. L. REv. 205 (1985).
68. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
69. See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943).

70. See, e.g., Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
71. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
72. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391 (1947).
73. The Supreme Court made clear in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
however, that Congress lacks authority in diversity cases to vest purely substantive
rulemaking power in the federal courts.
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constitutionally valid.74 Thus, one might question the basis for
invalidating congressional attempts to limit federal judicial power to
resolve the substantive outcome of cases.
1. Drawing a Constitutional/Sub-Constitutional Distinction:
Counter-Majoritarian Independence. To understand the role of
separation of powers in this area, the issue must be viewed from the
perspective of established American political theory. First, one must
distinguish between congressional attempts to prescribe constitutional
rules of decision on the one hand and nonconstitutional rules of decision
on the other. In vesting the federal courts with power to adjudicate a
case, Congress may conceivably seek either to exclude judicial power to
inquire into the constitutionality of the law that Congress is enforcing
or to prescribe a particular outcome of the constitutional inquiry. These
congressional attempts are unconstitutional, because they undermine the
essence of the counter-majoritarian principle that underlies American
political theory. That principle posits that the very majoritarian bodies
intended 'to be limited by the counter-majoritarian Constitution may not
sit as the final arbiter of the constitutionality of their own actions, lest
the Constitution be effectively rendered a dead letter.75 This conclusion, in short, describes what I refer to as the concept of countermajoritarian independence.
The fact that Congress presumably has power under Article III to
exclude federal jurisdiction completely does not alter this conclusion.
The postulate that "the greater includes the lesser' is inapplicable in
this context, because the congressional power to exclude federal
adjudicatory power proceeds on the assumption that in such an. event
the state courts will be in a position to exercise the full judicial power.7'
When Congress leaves enforcement power in a federal court but denies
to that court the power to review the constitutionality of the law it is
enforcing, the hypothetical availability of the state courts fails to provide
a safety valve, even though those courts could themselves have
constitutionally been vested with full adjudicatory power. This type of
congressional action undermines the quid pro quo philosophy implicit in
the structure of Article III: If Congress wishes to enlist the special
legitimacy traditionally associated with the decision of an Article III

74. For this reason, it appears clear that apart from nondelegation questions, resolved
in Mistrettathe congressional provision of sentences does not unconstitutionally invade the

judicial province.
75. See discussion supra part IU.
76. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953).
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court, Congress must allow that court to decide the case freely. The
textual basis of this principle of separation- of-powers derives from the
precept that an inherent element of the judicial power textually
described in Article III is the power of the court to assure that its actions
are consistent with the Constitution that the judges are sworn to
enforce.
When the issue concerns the power of Congress to limit federal judicial
power to find sub-constitutional rules of decision, however, the attacks
on congressional authority become considerably more problematic.
Congress has power under Article I to adopt laws that provide substantive rules of decision in the federal courts. The unrepresentative,
unaccountable federal judiciary has no authority to ignore or supplant
these rules of decision, short of a finding of unconstitutionality.
2. Procedural Limitations on Judicial Power to Apply Substantive Law. The preceding reasoning supports the conclusion that the
federal courts are denied lawmaking independence. The principle of
decisional independence, however, places important limitations on
congressional power. One of those limitations occurs in situations in
which Congress has provided a general rule of decision but has
simultaneously imposed procedural or evidentiary rules that effectively
prohibit the federal courts from accurately applying that rule of decision
in a particular situation. In this context, one should note the important
distinction between congressional power to create general exceptions to
a generalized substantive rule of decision on the one hand, and
congressional power to prohibit the federal courts from finding that the
standards of a general rule of decision have been either met or violated
in a particular case, on the other. In the former situation, Congress is
simply exercising its legislative power to establish general rules of
behavior, and, assuming no equal protection problems, the creation of
such exceptions should pass constitutional muster. In the latter context,
Congress is interfering with the proper performance of the judicial
fimction by effectively conscripting the judiciary as an unwilling
coconspirator in what amounts to the imposition of a legislative fraud on
the public.
From the perspective of American political theory, such congressional
behavior is unacceptable. For example, in formally adopting "standard
A7 as a general rule of decision, while simultaneously requiring the
federal courts to reach decisions that effectively amount to adoption of
"standard B" or "standard 'not A,'" Congress has substantially subverted
the representational democratic process. Congress has done so by
undermining the ability of the electorate to judge members of Congress
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through those members' votes on legislation embodying particular
normative social policy choices."
This congressional action is invalid, even if one assumes that Congress
could constitutionally have chosen to adopt either "standard B" or
"standard 'not A'" as the controlling substantive rule of decision in the
first place. Under separation-of-powers principles, this congressional
action is defective, because it effectively enlists the federal judiciary in
a scheme to bring, about voter confusion. In so doing, Congress
undermines the political commitment principle. This concept is central
to even a diluted form of democratic theory, which dictates that in voting
on proposed legislation elected representatives must make a sufficiently
clear commitment to assist the electorate in making future governing
choices.7" Hence, by undermining the political commitment principle
Congress both undermines the legitimacy of the federal adjudicatory
process and unduly truncates the judicial power to resolve a case before
it. This action should therefore be found to breach Article IIIs vestiture
of the judicial power in the federal courts.
Under certain circumstances, this action could also violate the
procedural due process rights of a litigant to a full and fair adjudication
of his claim. Though Congress may have power to prescribe a different
or even contradictory rule of decision, unless and until it does so a
litigant has a right to be fairly heard on his claim that the standard of
the existing rule of decision has been met in his individual case (at least
to the extent that liberty or property interests are sufficiently implicated
to trigger the due process requirement).
For these reasons, Justice Scalia was incorrect in rejecting a procedural due process challenge in Michael H. v. GeraldD." The case (which
primarily concerned questions over the scope of substantive due process
rights) involved a constitutional challenge to the denial of parental
rights of a man -claiming to be the biological father of a marrried
woman's child. His procedural due process objection concerned section
621 of the California Evidence Code,' which provides that a child born
to a married woman living with her husband, who is neither impotent
nor sterile, is presumed to be a child of the marriage.8 " The presumption may be rebutted only by the husband or wife, and even then only
in limited circumstances.'

77.

See REDisa, supra note 42, at 136.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

I examine this principle in detail in REDISH, supra note 42, at 154-58.
491 U.S. 110 (1989).
CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West 1966 & Supp. 1994).
Id.
Id
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Justice Scalia, speaking for a majority of the Court, rejected the
challenge, because
This claim derives from a fundamental misconception of the nature of
the California statute. While section 621 is phrased in terms of a
presumption, that rule of evidence is the implementation of a substantive rule of law. California declares it to be, except in limited circumstances, irrelevant for paternity purposes whether a child conceived
during, and born into, an existing marriage was begotten by someone
other than the husband ....
Of course the conclusive presumption not only expresses the State's
substantive policy but also furthers it, excluding inquiries into the
child's paternity that would be destructive of family integrity and
privacy."
Justice Scalia conceded that "[a) conclusive presumption does, of course,
foreclose the person against whom it is invoked from demonstrating in
a particularized proceeding, that applying the presumption to him will
in fact not further the lawful governmental policy the presumption is
designed to effectuate."" He responded, however, that "the same can
be said of any legal rule that establishes general classifications, whether
framed in terms of a presumption or not.'
In this analysis, Justice Scalia missed the key point underlying the
concept of decisional independence. To be sure, assuming no violation
of relevant substantive constitutional rights, California may adopt the
rule that a biological father has no tights in his child when the mother
is married to another man. But California did not adopt such a rule.
Instead, it adopted a law that purports to have rights turn on the factual
issue of who the natural father is, yet, through evidentiary manipulation
indirectly effects a very different public policy' If government wishes
to attain a particular public policy, our constitutional democratic theory
dictates that government do so openly, to assure that the choice is
subject to the scrutiny, and ultimate judgment, of the electorate.
For reasons of both separation of powers and due process, then, the
deceptively simple logical principle that "the greater includes the
lesser" does not work in this context. The mere fact that a legislature
constitutionally could have chosen a particular substantive legal
standard should not be taken to imply that it constitutionally may
purport to establish a different substantive standard yet effectively

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

491 U.S. at 119-20.
Id. at 120.
Id.
CAL. EvwD. CODE § 621.
See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943) (discussed in supra note 2).
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achieve the alternative standard by resort to procedural and evidentiary
manipulation. One may draw an analogy to an aspect of modern public
choice theory: An interpreting court should not construe a legislative
enactment framed in terms of public purposes to achieve some surreptitious private-regarding purpose, even if the interpreting court is
convinced that such a private purpose actually does underlie the
statute.'
If the legislature wishes to attain its private-regarding
purpose, it should be required to provide explicitly, lest public policies
effectively be developed in disguise.
3. Legislative or Executive Resolution of Individual Litigation.
A second limitation on congressional authority the principle of
decisional independence imposes is that Congress may not, through
legislation, dictate the resolution of an individual litigation. Of course,
Congress may, through enactment of general substantive legislation,
effectively dictate the result in individual cases, because the federal
courts are bound to apply constitutionally valid congressional legislation
in the course of individual litigations. But if the principle of separationof-powers dictated by the Constitution's allocation of distinct authority
to the several branches means anything, the principle means that one
branch may not totally usurp another branch's function.'
When
Congress does nothing more than dictate resolution of an individual
litigation, much as when it enacts, a constitutionally prohibited bill of
attainder,' Congress exceeds its constitutional authority
B.

Placing United States v. Klein in Perspective
Acceptance of this theory may render more coherent the doctrine that
has evolved from the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Klein.91 Congress had provided that persons whose property had been
seized during the Civil War could recover the property or the proceeds
from its sale upon proof that they had not given aid or comfort to the
enemy during the War.' The Supreme Court had previously held that
a presidential pardon for activities during the War constituted proof that
the person had not given aid or comfort to the enemy." The Court's
theory was that the constitutional effect of the pardon, unless specifically

88. See Jonathan R. Macey, PromotingPublic-RegardingLegislation
Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986).
89. See discussion supra part III.
90. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, c. 3.
91. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
92. Id at 139.
93. See id. at 131.
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limited by the president, is that the pardoned person is treated as if he
had not committed the pardoned acts."
Klein, representing a pardoned decedent, sued in the Court of Claims
to recover the proceeds of seized property. Adhering to Supreme Court
precedent, the Court of Claims granted relief.9 5 The government
appealed, and while the case was pending in the Supreme Court,
Congress enacted legislation providing that federal courts should treat
a pardon as proof that a person had been disloyal and that the Supreme
Court should dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction."
Despite the explicit constitutional directive empowering Congress to
create exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction," the
Court found both this limitation on its jurisdiction and the congressional
direction to treat pardons as proof of disloyalty to be unconstitutional."
The Court's explanation for its decision is arguably subject to a broad
interpretation, one that recognizes substantial limits on Congress' ability
to prescribe rules of decision for the federal judiciary."
As the
Supreme Court has described the Klein rationale in a modern decision,
the congressional proviso was unconstitutional in part because "it
prescribed a rule of decision in a case pending before the courts, and did
so in a manner that required the courts to decide a controversy in the
Government's favor."1°° However, to the extent that Congress has
done nothing more than enact a general rule of decision to be employed
in relevant litigation, the constitutional problem is difficult to comprehend. Enacting general rules is what Congress always does in the
exercise of its legislative power and, assuming no other constitutional
violation, the fact that Congress prescribes a rule of decision favorable
to the government would seem to give rise to no separation-of-powers
difficulty. Nor does it appear constitutionally problematic that Congress
adopts a new general rule of decision while a case is pending on appeal.
In this event, the court's obligation is generally to apply the relevant
substantive law as it exists at the time of decision. 101
The true constitutional difficulties raised on the facts of Klein, then,
must concern something other than a mere congressional revision of a
general, substantive rule of decision. Those difficulties appear to be

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 147.
Id. at 128.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 141-42.
See id. at 146.
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 404 (1980).
See discussion supra part IV.A.2.
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threefold. The most significant problem was that Congress was
effectively telling the Court how to determine the ramifications of the
president's exercise of his constitutionally delegated pardon power. In
so doing, Congress was violating the fundamental separation-of-powers
precept, embodied in the principle of counter-majoritarian independence,' that Congress may not tell an Article HI court how to
interpret the Constitution. A second possible difficulty was that rather
than enacting a general rule of decision, Congress was arguably doing
nothing more than dictating the decision in a specific litigation. In so
doing, Congress is simultaneously performing a purely judicial function
(in violation of a formalist model of separation-of-powers) and seriously
interfering with the judiciary's performance of its proper function (in
violation 3of a supplemental functionalist model of separation-of10
powers).
It was largely on the basis of this reasoning that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Seattle Audubon Society v.
Robertson,'' invalidated congressional legislation. The legislation
appeared to create special exceptions to otherwise generally applicable
laws for the purpose of affecting the resolution of particular litigation."5 Although the Supreme Court reversed,"~ it did so only on
the grounds that, contrary to the Ninth Circuit's perception, the
challenged laws actually did alter preexisting general law."'
Puzzlingly, the Court expressly left untouched the implications of Klein'
for a situation similar to the one the Ninth Circuit perceived to have
existed in Robertson.y) The Court would have been better advised to
reiterate, or at least not cast doubt upon, what every observer should
reasonably be expected to understand: that Congress may not adjudicate
individual litigations.
Whether the legislation struck down in Klein actually constituted the
resolution of a particular litigation, rather than the adoption of a
generally applicable rule of decision is debatable. One might reasonably
view the challenged legislation in that case as merely a generally
phrased enactment having an impact in individual litigation, even
though when enacted the legislation was quite obviously directed to the

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See discussion supra part I.
See REDISH, supra note 17, at 119-20.
914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
914 F.2d at 1317.
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soe'y, 112 S. Ct. 1407, 1413 (1992).
Id. at 1414.
Id.
1d
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resolution of that litigation. However, that congressional proviso was
also problematic because, to the extent it actually represented adoption
of a generally applicable rule, that rule did not alter the applicable
substantive rule of decision. Rather, the rule imposed on the Court an
obligation to treat probative evidence differently from the way the Court
would otherwise have chosen to treat it, with the goal of effectively
altering the substantive rule of decision without legally doing so. For
reasons already discussed,"'0 these legislative attempts to manipulate
the judicial process should be deemed unconstitutional.
It does not automatically follow from this conclusion that Congress, for
this reason alone, would necessarily be prevented from adopting rules of
evidence that are to apply in federal litigation. As long as those
evidentiary rules are substantively agnostic (not tied to a particular
substantive rule of decision or clearly designed indirectly to bring about
a specific substantive outcome) and the specific evidentiary rules adopted
do not substantially interfere either with the factfinder's ability to find
facts or with the court's ability to perform its judicial function of fairly
and freely applying the law to the facts of the case, such rules do not
violate the principles of Klein.
C.

CongressionalReopening of Final Judgments
One possible application of the Klein doctrine concerns the constitutionality of congressional efforts simultaneously to alter substantive law
and reopen final judgments of the federal courts in order to revise them
in accordance with those alterations. Section 27A(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934,"1 a provision added to the Act by amendment in 1991, presents this issue most clearly. The amendment came
in response to a Supreme Court decision construing the 1934 Act to
establish a uniform rule that "[]itigation instituted pursuant to section
10(b)... must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the
facts constituting the violation and within three years after such
violation ... . U. In a separate decision made the same day, the Court
held that this statute of limitations was to be applied to pending claims
brought under section 10(b)." 3 As a result, various district courts
dismissed pending suits. In response, Congress enacted section 27A,
which provides:

110. See discussion supra part IVA.2.
111. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27A (amended by Pub. L. No. 102-242, Dec. 19,
1991, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1).
112. Lampf, Pleva, Lpkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991).
113. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991).
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(a) Effect on Pending Causes of Action-The limitation period for any
private civil action implied under section 78j (b) of this title that was
commenced on or before June 19, 1991, shall be the limitation period
provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles
of retro-activity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991.
(b) Effect on Dismissed Causes of Action-Any private civil action
implied under section 78j (b) of this title that was commenced on or
before June 19, 1991 (1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19,1991,
and
(2) which would have been timely filed under the limitation period
provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles
of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991.
shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than 60 days
after December 19, 1 9 9 1.u4

In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. FirstRepublicbank Corp., 5
a decision subsequently affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected a
challenge to section 27A(b) as a violation of Article HI.'1 The Fifth
Circuit reasoned that section 27A(b) respects the principle of Klein,
because the provision actually changed the governing general substantive law. 7 The Pacific Mutual Court assured that "[ilf we understood
a statute's purpose to be the reversal of results in particular controversies between private individuals, we would strike the statute as violative
of our authority to decide cases.""
While most courts of appeals that have considered the issue have
reached a similar conclusion, 1 9 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,' ° found section
27A(b) to be an unconstitutional interference with the performance of

114. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27A (amended by Pub. L. No. 102-242, Dec. 19,
1991, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1).
115. 997 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1993), afld, 114 S. Ct. 1827 (1994).
116. 997 F.2d at 52-54.
117. Id. at 53.
118. Id.
119. See generally Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 6 F.3d 78 (2d Cir.
1993); Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 34 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 1994); Anixter v. HomeStake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992).
120. 1 F.3d 1487 (6th Cir. 1993). As this Article went to press, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Sixth Circuit's decision in Plaut,holding that separation-of-powers principles
prevent Congress from reopening final decisions of the federal judiciary. Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 63 U.S.L.W. 4243 (April 18, 1995). It should be noted that the
analysis that follows differs from the Court's holding.
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the judicial function." Relying on the early Supreme Court decision
in Hayburn's Case,' the Sixth Circuit concluded that "the Supreme
Court has from the beginning maintained the rule that Congress may
not retroactively disturb final judgments of the Federal courts .... "'
The court's reliance on Hayburn's Case, however, was misplaced.
Indeed, by contrasting the situation in Plaut with that in Hayburn's
Case, we can better understand the limits of the concept of decisional
independence. In Hayburn the Court invalidated, on separation-ofpowers grounds, a congressional directive authorizing the Secretary of
War to review decisions of the federal courts accepting or rejecting
applications by Revolutionary War veterans for disability pensions.'"
The Secretary could deny pensions where he suspected imposition or
mistake."
The Plaut court cited Hayburn "to illustrate that the Supreme Court
has from the beginning maintained the rule that Congress may not
retroactively disturb final judgments of the Federal courts .*. . ."1
But Hayburn really establishes no such thing. Instead, it rightly
establishes that Congress may not authorize an executive officer to
review and reverse specific, individual federal court decisions. Section
27A, in contrast, alters the general governing law of the statute of
limitations in securities fraud cases and directs that the new law be
imposed with total retroactivity, even to the point of reopening
previously final judgments. Assuming no controlling due process rights
of litigants in those judgments, 27 such legislative action constitutes no
breach of constitutionally protected judicial independence. Decisional
independence prohibits review and reversal by the legislative or
executive branches of the result of a particular litigation; decisional
independence does not prohibit congressional alteration of controlling
substantive law that has the effect of altering a class of federal court
decisions.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 1493.
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792).
1 F.3d at 1493.
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410.
Id.
1 F.3d at 1493.
This issue is beyond the scope of the present inquiry.
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISIONAL-LAWMAKING DISTINCTION, II:
CONGRESS' POWER TO PRESCRIBE PROCEDURAL RULES FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS

A. Applying Separation-of-PowersTheory to CongressionalPrescription of ProceduralRules
Deciding whether congressional prescription of procedural rules for the
federal courts violates the constitutional protection of separation-ofpowers necessarily requires one to recall the various models of separation-of-powers theory' s From a formalist perspective, the constitutional inquiry is limited to the questions whether such action falls within
the concept of legislative power, and if so whether the action falls within
the scope of the powers the Constitution provides to Congress. As to the
first question, the definitional requirements of the exercise of legislative
power have been met as long as the rules prescribed are of general
applicability and affect the behavior of citizens. As to the second
inquiry, the Supreme Court made clear in Hanna v. Plumer'2 that
Congress' enumerated power to create inferior federal courts,1' 3
combined with its auxiliary power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause,"3 provides Congress with the authority to prescribe procedural
rules for the federal courts.1 "
If one were to shift the focus to functionalism, either in its supplemental, external, or internal manifestations,' one would inquire whether
an otherwise legitimate exercise of the legislative power should be
invalidated because it unduly invades the province of a coordinate
branch. The only way this question could be answered in the affirmative
is by concluding that the task of promulgating rules of procedure is so
intimately bound up in the performance of the judicial function that the
courts could not effectively exercise the judicial power without retaining
Reaching this
exclusive authority over procedural rulemaking.
conclusion appears difficult in light of the long and established history
of congressional involvement in the rulemaking process. Indeed, the
Supreme Court's power to promulgate procedural rules has traditionally
been rationalized as a congressional delegation of legislative power to the

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See discussion supra part III.C.2, III.C.3.
'
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
380 U.S. at 471-72.
See discussion supra part III.C.2, III.C.3.
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Court.'m At the very least, Congress has always retained ultimate
authority under the Rules Enabling Act to overrule specific rules
promulgated by the Court. This power would of course be unacceptable
if the judicial power over rulemaking were thought to be exclusive.
On a comparative basis, the power to promulgate general rules of
procedure in some senses is easier to conceptualize as a legislative action
than as a judicial one. Exercise of the judicial power is inherently
characterized by the adjudication of individualized, live disputes.'
Promulgation of free-standing rules of general applicability does not fit
within this model, even when those rules deal with matters that are
intimately intertwined with performance of the adjudicatory function.
Even if one were to conclude that procedural rulemaking does fall
within the judicial province,' that judicial authority is exclusive does
not automatically follow. From a purely functionalist perspective,
Congress retains a legitimate and significant interest in the procedures
and operations of the federal courts, for a number of reasons. First, the
success of the substantive federal legislative programs enforced in the
federal courts is inescapably intertwined with the procedural efficiency
of those courts. Second, the federal budget is invariably affected by the
procedural efficiency levels achieved in the federal courts. Thus, on the
basis of a type of functionalist interest analysis, the level of Congress'
legitimate interest in the choice of procedural rules that govern federal
court operation is virtually as intense as that of the federal courts
themselves.
The fact that congressional prescription of procedural rules is not, as
an abstract matter, invalid does not necessarily imply that all rules that
Congress could potentially adopt would pass constitutional muster under
a separation-of-powers standard. Conceivably, for example, a specific
procedural rule could so interfere with the courts' performance of the
judicial function, the full and fair performance of the adjudicatory
process of finding facts 7 and/or interpreting applicable law and
applying it to the facts,as as to invade the courts' "judicial power"
under Article III. However, this conclusion could be reached only in the
context of a consideration of challenges to particular rules.

134. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 471-72.
135. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc. 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrineof Standing as an
EssentialElement of the Separationof Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983).
136. See ITnda S. Mullenix, UnconstitutionalRulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform
Act and Separationof Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1288 (1993).
137. This power is, of course, subject to the Seventh Amendments requirement ofjury
trial in certain cases. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
138. See discussion supra part IVA.2.
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Constitutionalityof the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990

1. Judging the Act from the Perspective of the DecisionalLawmaking Dichotomy. In the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1 9 9 0 ,'s
Congress mandated the appointment, in each federal district, of an
advisory committee, to be composed largely of private attorneys who
practice in the district."0 In consultation with the advisory committee,
each district court was directed to formulate and adopt civil justice
expense and delay reduction plans. 1" In the words of one commentator, in this Act "Congress served notice that it was going to have civil
justice reform and have it immediately."'42
While the idea has been suggested that the Civil Justice Reform Act
improperly undermines the Rules Enabling Act,' surely the Act is
within Congress' power to enact a statute that repeals or modifies a
previously enacted statute. The Supreme Court has held that implied
repeals are to be heavily disfavored.'
However, if implementation of
a statute's unambiguous directives necessarily requires abandonment of
a directive contained in a prior statute, a conclusion of implied repeal is
inescapable; otherwise, the newly enacted statute could not be enforced.
Thus, at least as a constitutional matter the possibility that the
subsequently enacted Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 may undermine
the dictates of the Rules Enabling Act is of no real significance. No
reason in either constitutional text or governing political theory exists
to prevent Congress from enacting a statute that either explicitly or
implicitly modifies, repeals, or creates an exception to a prior statute.
Arguably, the fact that the Civil Justice Reform Act undermines so
venerable an enactment as the Rules Enabling Act simply adds to the
problems of social policy to which the former act is thought to give rise.
However, no legal or constitutional bar to such congressional action
exists.

139. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-50, 104 Stat. 5090 (codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (Supp. IV 1992)).
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 478 (Supp. IV 1992). According to one commentator, Itihe Act
mandates local, grassroots rulemaking by civilian advisory groups...." Linda S.
Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REv. 375, 377
(1992). At least as a technical matter, however, the committees do not actually possess
rulemaking power.
141. 28 U.S.C. § 472 (Supp. IV 1992).
142. Mullenix, supra note 140, at 377.
143. Id, at 426-29.
144. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
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The suggestion has also been made that this Act violates separation
of powers principles, "by substantially impairing the federal courts'
inherent Article III power to control their internal process and the
conduct of civil litigation."146 Initially, serious doubt exists that the
Act actually constrains the federal judiciary's discretion to fashion
procedural rules in any meaningful way. The advisory committees
mandated by the Act are given no formalized rulemaking power.'
Instead, the district court takes final action itself, and nothing in the Act
precludes the court from rejecting any recommendation made by the
committee. 47 Moreover, nothing in the Act appears in any way to
affect the preexisting authority of a district court, pursuant to Rule 83
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' to promulgate local rules, so
the Act apparently does not prohibit a court from promulgating specific
rules the advisory committee has not approved. Hence, a separation-ofpowers issue only arises if one assumes that the creation of the advisory
committees somehow will, as a practical matter, confine or inhibit
district court rulemaking power 4 9 -surely a most difficult position on
which to base a finding of unconstitutionality.
Even if one were to proceed on the assumption that the advisory
committees had in fact been delegated formal rulemaking power, the
conclusion that the Act breached separation of powers by unduly
invading the judicial province would be most tenuous. The separationof-powers challenge is premised on the view that "Congress is wrong in
declaring-as it does in the legislative history to the Act-that it has
exclusive federal rulemaking power."' But such reasoning misses the
point. The question is not whether congressional rulemaking power is
exclusive, but rather whether it is preemptive. Absent preemptive
congressional legislation, it is not only appropriate but essential for
federal courts, as a matter of common law development,' to fashion
145. Mullenix, supra note 136, at 1287.
146. See 28 U.S.C. § 478 (Supp. IV 1992).
147. Id.
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
149. Professor Mullenix, who believes the Act does violate separation of powers
principles, acknowledges that E[t"o be successful... a separation-of-powers challenge to the
Act must demonstrate that the provisions requiring judicial action are merely hollow
gestures to the judicial branch's rulemaking authority, and that the procedural reforms
that advisory groups recommend are congresionally-inspired, mandated, and enacted."
Mullenix, supra note 136, at 1296.
150. Id. at 1287 (footnote omitted).
151. Serious constitutional questions may be raised concerning the power ofan Article
III court to promulgate generalized rules of procedure, not tied to individual case
adjudication. See Martin H. Redish, Separation of Powers, JudicialAuthority, and the
Scope of Article III: The Troubling Cases of Morrison and Mistretta,39 DEPAUL L. REV.
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procedural principles to govern their internal operation. It no way
logically follows, however, that Congress lacks constitutional authority
to enact generally applicable procedural rules that take precedence over
such judicially developed common law rules. For reasons already
discussed, such congressional action-at least in the abstract-falls
within both the constitutional restriction of congressional authority to
the exercise of legislative power and the substantive scope of Congress'
powers under Article .'62 Hence, difficultly is created when trying to
understand how the Civil Justice Reform Act can be thought in any way
to represent an undue accretion of congressional power.
2. Inquiring Whether the Act Breaches the Non-Delegation
Doctrine. The mere fact that Congress may itself preempt, through
legislation, judicial rulemaking power does not automatically imply that
Congress may delegate that authority to an unaccountable body. The
inability to delegate rule making power is especially true when as little
guidance exists as the Civil Justice Reform Act provides to the advisory
committees.'
Modern Supreme Court decisions have all but abandoned the nondelegation doctrine.' This development is unfortunate,
in light of the important values of representationalism that the doctrine
may foster.'
Arguably, however, when Congress delegates authority
to control the internal operation of the judiciary, this delegation should
be deemed impermissible. At the very least, more detailed standards of
direction in the delegation should be demanded. This argument is
premised on the view that the strongest protection against unnecessary
and intrusive congressional limitations on judicial authority--especially
when those limitations are constitutionally valid-is the political check
on Congress provided by the electorate. In other words, the concern of
the voters will restrain Congress from interfering with the judicial
province.
In the area of congressional-judicial relations, politically valuable
judicial independence is often protected primarily through this political
check, as the failure of the Roosevelt Court-packing plan arguably
illustrates. To allow virtually unlimited delegations in this area, then,
could threaten the politically-based wing of the separation-of-powers
protections. These are concerns not present in the normal delegation
context. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

299, 314-19 (1990).
152. See discussion supra part IV.A.2.
153. See Mullenix, supra note 136, at 1322.
154. See supra note 60.
155. See generally REDISH, supra note 17, at 135-61.
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stated in United States v. Mitchell, 1 "one can readily distinguish
between Congress' ability to delegate its commerce power over price
controls during wartime ... and its ability to delegate a power as
sensitive and central to our Anglo-American legal tradition as shaping
a federal court's jurisdiction."' 7 The Seventh Circuit expressed serious
concern that "Congress [would be able] to delegate such a core legislative
function as its control over federal court jurisdiction to any agency or
commission.""5 Moreover, delegations to independent contractors,' 9
such as the private citizens who make up the advisory committees, are
even more suspect, because these delegations vest important policymaking authority in individuals who are even more removed from political
responsiveness.
The concerns over the impact of delegation on congressional-judicial
relations is at its strongest when the congressional delegation involves
the procedural rulemaking power. Delegations of the power to make
substantive rules of decision do not give rise to such problems, because
even absent congressional action the federal courts lack power under the
Rules of Decision Act"co to fashion purely substantive common law
principles. Thus, if the Civil Justice Reform Act were construed to vest
rulemaking power in the advisory committees,'
a nondelegation
challenge might be made.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although Congress possesses broad constitutional authority to regulate
federal court jurisdiction, it would be both inaccurate and dangerous to
believe that the federal courts possess no meaningful independence from
the representative branches of the federal government. These institutional independence guarantees expressly provided for in the Compensation Clause of Article III provide a basic prophylactic floor of independence. Moreover, the established constitutional principles of due process
and separation-of-powers, embodying fundamental principles of
American constitutional and political theory, guarantee to the federal
courts, or at least to the judiciary as a whole,' 2 both counter-majori-

156. 18 F.3d 1355 (7th Cir. 1994).
157. Id. at 1360.
158. Id. at 1360 n.7.
159. The Act describes the advisory committees in this manner. See 28 U.S.C. § 478(f)
(Supp. IV 1992).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
161. But see discussion supra part III.C.3.
162. It should be recalled that Congress is widely thought to possess power to remove
even constitutional cases from the lower federal courts. See supra note 67. However, this
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tarian and decisional independence. These guarantees ensure judicial
authorities the power to interpret the Constitution and apply the law to
individual cases free from pressure or control of the representative
branches.
An equally inaccurate suggestion, however, is that the constitutional
principle of judicial independence somehow consumes the democratic
integrity of our governmental system, by authorizing the federal courts
to promulgate generalized rules of decision or procedure that are
insulated from alteration or preemption by the representative branches.
Like most aspects of the American political system, judicial independence reflects a delicate balance of both democratic theory, concerned
with principles ofrepresentationalism and accountability, and republican
precepts, focused upon the need to curb democratic excesses. Such a
balancing process may be properly performed only by recognition of the
subtle variations in the framework of federal judicial independence.
In her reply to this article,l"' Professor Linda Mullenix evinces an
inability or unwillingness to comprehend several fundamental precepts
that underly the operation of the American governmental system. The
first of these precepts is the distinction between a legislative-legislative
conflict and a legislative-constitutional conflict. For example, she
puzzlingly persists in her assertion that the Civil Justice Reform Act is
defective because of its claimed inconsistency with the Rules Enabling
Act.'" But to the extent two federal statutes are inescapably in
conflict, the statute that is later in time always takes precedence.'
The conclusion is as simple as that, because Congress may repeal or
modify its previously enacted statutes. It is only because she fails to
understand so basic a lesson in American Civics that Professor Mullenix
can persist in her truly absurd suggestion that a federal statute is
somehow invalidated because of its inconsistency with a previously
enacted statute.
Professor Mullenix's reply also evinces a total misunderstanding of the
Erie doctrine's'c central tenets. In discussing the Erie line of cases,' Professor Mullenix suggests that the doctrine is "not a resound-

power is premised on the assumed availability of the state courts as adequate judicial
forums to enforce federal constitutional rights. See Hart, supra note 76. A denial of any
independent forum for the adjudication of constitutional rights would almost certainly
violate due process. See Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
163. Linda S. Mullenix, Judicial Power and The Rules EnablingAct, 46 MERCER L.
REV. 733 (1995).
164. Id. at 747-51.
165. Id.
166. See generally Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
167. Mullenix, supra note 163, at 745.
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ing affirmation of Congressional procedural rulemaking authority, but
rather ofjudicial rulemaking authority as it is properly exercised." But
the Erie line of cases does no such thing. Rather, it affirms that while
the Constitution places limits on congressional authority to delegate
purely substantive lawmaking authority to the federal judiciary, as to
matters that are arguably procedural the issue is solely a matter of
congressional intent.
Finally, Professor Mullenix's reply fails to recognize the vital
distinction between constitutional problems with a statute on the one
hand and pure policy concerns about that statute, on the other. Indeed,
her comment reflects an obviously intense disagreement with the
normative policy judgments embodied in the Civil Justice Reform Act.
At no point, however, does her analysis reflect the slightest grounding
of her concerns in the Constitution. Absent such a grounding, her
problem would seem to be simply a matter of political disagreement,
hardly a sound basis, in a democratic society, on which to invalidate
properly enacted federal legislation.

